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ARTICLE




The archives of the Secretariat General for African and Malagasy Affairs 
(1958-1974) include a variety of documents on French intelligence in a 
post-war era marked by decolonisation. Among them is a 6-page long 
table synthesising information on 38 paramilitary operations conducted 
or cancelled from January 1956 to March 1958, as well as nine additional 
operations that were ‘in preparation’ at the time. A detailed analysis of this 
document adds to our understanding of the French experience with 
covert action in the context of the Algerian War of Independence, and 
shows how the fog and friction of ‘secret war’ reinforce the subjective 
nature of reporting on and assessing covert action’s effectiveness.
Introduction: a window into French 'action clandestine'
This article analyses a unique document (translated into English and made available in an Annex to 
the article) presenting 47 paramilitary actions that were planned or conducted by French operators 
between 1956 and 1958.1 Analysing this document contributes to our understanding of the French 
experience with covert action (action clandestine)2 in the context of the Algerian war of 
Independence (1954–1962). At a more conceptual level, the argument developed in this article 
emphasises the subjective nature of reporting on and assessing covert action’s effectiveness.
The context in which this document was produced is one of violence, crisis and transition. 
Communal and state violence characterised political life in the French territory of Algeria for decades 
before it escalated into a rebellion on 1 November 1954, when the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) 
coordinated a series of attacks on French installations and settlers.3 This rebellion turned into an 
armed conflict, characterised by guerrilla warfare and a brutal and extensive counterinsurgency 
campaign.4 This bloody colonial war pushed the institutions of the French Fourth Republic (1946– 
1958) to the brink. The conflict progressively blurred the boundaries between military and civilian 
authorities and spilled over to the metropole. During the ‘political crisis’ of May 1958, elements of the 
military and supporters of Charles de Gaulle decided to take action against the government, 
demanding – some would argue forcing – de Gaulle’s return to power.5 On 1 June 1958, de Gaulle 
was sworn in as Président du Conseil (Prime Minister). De Gaulle eventually decided to open 
negotiations with the FLN, which paved the way for the Evian Accords, and Algeria’s self- 
determination in 1962.
Following his return to power, de Gaulle nominated Jacques Foccart as technical adviser. Foccart 
would keep this position during the period of transition that led to the adoption of a new constitu-
tion in October 1958. He then became Presidential adviser for African and Malagasy Affairs for de 
Gaulle and remained in this post during George Pompidou’s presidency (1969–1974). Foccart’s 
papers have now been consolidated as a part of the archives of the General Secretariat for African 
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and Malagasy Affairs at the Archives Nationales in Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, leading to a series of seminal 
publications by French historians in the last decade.6
Several boxes in these archives show that Foccart took a keen interest in the structure and 
activities of French intelligence. This interest is normal to the extent that senior officials rely on 
intelligence to inform their policymaking effort. Following his own experience of résistance during 
the Second World War, Foccart maintained a more personal interest in intelligence affairs and 
clandestine activities throughout his life.7 As a result, some of the records available in the Fonds 
Foccart provide a unique – but by no means comprehensive – window into French intelligence 
activities in the context of decolonisation.8
While former senior government officials and researchers have discussed France’s use of para-
military operations in its ‘secret war’ to neutralise the FLN,9 archival records detailing their planning, 
conduct and outcomes remain extremely rare. A folder on ‘intelligence reform’, openly available in 
the Fonds Foccart, includes a file with a manuscript note on its cover reading ‘SDECE’ [Service de 
documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage, France’s foreign intelligence agency from 1946 to 
1982] and ‘Retour Mr Foccard’ (Foccart’s feedback). This file includes a dozen of documents present-
ing the targets and means of paramilitary operations.10 One of these documents stands out because 
of its broad scope and the operational details it provides.
This document takes the form of a table synthesising information on 38 operations con-
ducted or cancelled from January 1956 to March 1958, as well as nine additional operations that 
were ‘in preparation’ at the time (bringing the total to 47 operations).11 Though information on 
the authorship and date do not feature on this document, its format, content and location 
suggest this table was produced by the SDECE, or someone who had access to highly sensitive 
SDECE and military reports,12 between March and August 1958. The document would have 
provided Foccart access to basic information on past paramilitary actions (a form of post facto 
oversight). This table provides a unique opportunity to shed light on the scope and the 
perceived effectiveness of French paramilitary actions in the context of the Algerian war and 
during the Suez crisis debacle. However, the document provides no information on a number of 
other aspects, not least the rationales and broader strategy these actions were supposed to 
serve.13
Range and patterns of operations
The table, entitled ‘Operations conducted since the 1st of January 1956ʹ, is an inventory that offers 
general information on a series of French paramilitary actions.14 Two main types of paramilitary 
actions are presented: sabotage and homicide operations (ARMA and HOMO operations in French 
intelligence jargon). Several columns in the table describe the target, location, date, means, outcome 
and result of each operation, but the rationales explaining these operations, the organisation 
responsible for them, and the sources and methods used to identify targets are not provided. 
Altogether the table presents 29 sabotage operations (61% of the operations) and 17 homicide 
operations (36%).
One operation does not fall in these two categories, and involved selling arms to FLN interme-
diaries to arrest them in Lyon, France. This is the only action that took place in metropolitan France. 
Two other operations took place in Algeria, a French territory at the time. One led to the elimination 
of Mostefa Ben Boulaid (a Second World War veteran and founding member of the FLN) in 
March 1956, the other successfully started a fire on board of a German cargo that was moored in 
Algerian waters in January 1958. Together these three operations confirm that the services were 
conducting actions in France – whether in the metropole or French territories – and against French 
citizens like Ben Boulaid.15
The timeline of the operations mentioned in the summary table ranges from January 1956 to 
March 1958 and coincides with four Prime Ministerships, underlining the political instability that 
characterised the Fourth Republic.16 Under these conditions, maintaining comprehensive political 
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oversight of paramilitary actions must have been challenging. The frequency of the operations 
shows that they became more prominent in 1957 as the conflict intensified, most notably during 
the pivotal ‘Battle of Algiers’ (22 operations, compared to 12 operations in 1956).17 A majority of 
operations focused on targets located in North Africa (68% of the operations) with 18 operations in 
Morocco, six in Tunisia, three in Libya, three in Egypt and two in Algeria. The remaining operations 
took place in Europe (three in Germany, two in Italy, two in Spain, two in Switzerland, one in Belgium, 
and one in France) and the Middle East (one in Syria, one in Turkey) as well as the Mediterranean sea. 
We can infer from these locations that these paramilitary actions were mostly planned or used to 
destroy and eliminate targets beyond Algeria, in countries where material and political support to 
the FLN and its armed wing (the Armée de Libération Nationale or ALN) originated or transited. In 
Algeria, the military was overtly seeking to exert its control, beyond Algeria paramilitary actions 
targeted the FLN’s networks in more unacknowledged ways.
The geographic spread of these paramilitary actions can also be linked to the internationalisation 
of the Algerian war. On the one side, the FLN relied on international partners to secure logistical 
support and garner political legitimacy.18 On the other side, French control over Algeria forced some 
elements of the FLN to retreat and seek support abroad.19 The French authorities internationalised 
the conflict when targeting the FLN’s network through a series of paramilitary operations that 
violated the sovereignty of over a dozen countries. All of the countries in which the paramilitary 
actions were conducted were less powerful than France and some of them were partially dependent 
on France. One hypothesis is that France’s geopolitical superiority over these countries decreased 
the political and diplomatic risks posed by the actions.20 By contrast, decision-makers seemed to 
show more caution, cancelling and avoiding operations in or against targets that could be associated 
with relatively powerful or influential (non-aligned) countries such as Yugoslavia, Egypt and Syria.
The summary table also provides useful information on the type of objectives France considered 
targeting. Sabotage operations targeted three main types of infrastructure related to the FLN: arms 
dealer’s boats, cargo or tankers and vehicles (15 cases), training camps and supporters’ premises 
(twelve cases) and radio stations (two cases, both cancelled by governmental order).21 The first 
operation presented on the table is a sabotage operation taking the form of three explosions in 
Tétouan, which was part of a Spanish protectorate at the time. The entry in the table notes that these 
explosions took place during a visit from French resident-general in Morocco André Dubois to 
Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco General Garcia Valino on 10 January 1956. However, news 
media coverage of their meeting between does not mention any explosion.22 Presumably, the 
explosions targeted FLN infrastructure in Tétouan shortly before, during or after this meeting to 
strengthen the French position and rally Spanish support.
The targets of homicide operations can broadly be divided into two groups: individuals who were 
directly involved in or supported FLN operations on the ground, and political figures. Supporters of 
the FLN who were targeted included arms traffickers Driss Ben Said, Ahmed Kamal, Marcel Léopold 
[LEOPOLD in the table], Hans Peter Rullmann [RUHLMAN] and Otto Schlüter [SCHLUTTER].23 These 
HOMO operations directly supported the French strategy to disrupt FLN supply networks. Two 
individuals featuring on the list of objectives could not be identified Bou Zidia (who was injured 
by a homicide operation in August 1957) and Abdel Kafi Jazouli (who is mentioned as the target of an 
operation in preparation). The difficulty in finding more information about these two targets 
suggests they were involved in operational support rather than more politically visible activities. 
The research did identify two other, hitherto unknown ‘targets’. In April 1957, a parcel bomb killed 
pharmacist Rahal Saad in Meknes, Morocco. A newswire published on 22 April 1957 notes that Saad 
had stopped paying his ‘contribution’ to FLN agents.24 This dispatch is probably a piece of disin-
formation authored by French propagandists to maintain plausible deniability and turn the local 
population against the FLN. This would suggest that French authorities coordinated some of their 
paramilitary and information operations to reinforce their deniability and maximise their psycholo-
gical impact. An article published in 2006 in an Algerian magazine mentions Saad as a member of 
a group of health professionals who offered their services to the FLN and its Armée de Libération 
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Nationale.25 Though the author of this article does not cite his sources, this type of support would 
explain why Saad was targeted and eliminated.
These assassinations fit a broader pattern according to which French authorities targeted indivi-
duals ‘participating to the rebellion’, and sometimes also their family.26 This pattern explains the 
elimination of Dr. Tonnelot the head physician of a hospital that provided medical care to Algerian 
rebels.27 The level of involvement of Saad and Tonnelot in FLN activities remains unclear. Did they 
provide basic health support to the ‘rebels’? If so, their targeting would seem disproportionate. Or 
did their provide access to materials that enabled violent action? Regardless of their role in the 
insurgency, the table shows that the operations targeting them hit their families, which raises doubt 
about their proportionality. From this perspective, these two operations reflect the indiscriminate 
manner in which French authorities sought to exert control on the FLN, its supporters and the local 
population. This fits a broader pattern of colonial violence which antagonized locals, feeding a sense 
of injustice and revolt that was echoed in FLN propaganda and damaged France’s broader counter-
insurgency effort.28
Cancellations and restraint
The last two columns of the table provide basic information on the outcome and result of each 
operation. While 38 operations were planned from January 1956 to March 1958, ‘superior’ and 
‘governmental orders’ cancelled eight of them. If this distinction is intentional, political appointees 
would have given ‘governmental orders’ (cancelling four operations), while commanding officers 
provided ‘superior orders’ (cancelling four other operations). These cancellations confirm the exis-
tence of a chain of command – operators were not going rogue. They submitted at least some of 
their plans for approval to relevant decision-makers at the military and possibly at the political 
level.29 Nine operations were still ‘in preparation’ when the table was drafted and presented as 
‘waiting for the order to execute’. This language reinforces the sense that superiors authorised these 
operations.
The operations seeking to eliminate high-level political figures – FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella 
(operation planned for July 1956), Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (planned for 
December 1956 a few months after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and France’s failed 
intervention in Egypt), and Moroccan politician and nationalist Allal al Fassi (planned for 
April 1957)30 – were all cancelled by governmental or superior order. The operation targeting former 
National Assembly representative and Mauritanian politician Horma Ould Babana remained ‘in 
preparation’ and ‘waiting for the order to execute’ at the time the table was written, but was 
presumably never authorised or failed since Babana died years later in 1980.31 These cancellations 
suggest that French decision-makers reviewed and ruled out operations that proposed to eliminate 
well-known political figures supporting Algerian independence, possibly because of the interna-
tional wave of indignation that would have followed and the escalation eliminating such figures 
would have caused both in the context of the Algerian war and the Cold War. The international 
situation would thus be a crucial factor in explaining and limiting recourse to paramilitary actions. 
The caution displayed in these politically-sensitive cases demonstrates that decisions followed 
political logics, and contrasts with the more indiscriminate targeting of FLN support networks.
The restraint displayed toward high-level political figures did not extend to those who were more 
directly involved in operations against the French authorities. Mosteffa Ben Boulaïd [Ben Moulaid in 
the document] was a veteran of the Second World War and a founding member of the Committee of 
Twenty-Two which called for armed struggle and sought to coordinate the Algerian insurrection 
from June 1954 onwards. As such he was a political figure, but he was also directly involved in 
coordinating the fight against French forces in the Aurès province and presented as ‘an important 
rebel chief’ in the table. Arrested and sentenced to death for his activities, he escaped from prison in 
November 1955.32 The table confirms that a French operation planted a bomb in a radio that killed 
Ben Boulaïd a few months later. By contrast, Ahmed Ben Bella was also a member of the 
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revolutionary committee, but he played a more diplomatic role as an FLN delegate in Cairo. This 
external role, and the support he was offered by his Egyptian hosts can explain why he was spared.33 
Yet French restraint did not prevent the military, acting without government approval, from hijack-
ing a plane transporting Ben Bella and four other FLN leaders on 22 October 1956.34 This episode 
contrasts with the sense of control that is conveyed by the ‘orders’ mentioned in the summary table.
Five ARMA operations were ‘cancelled by superior order’. Two of these proposed to destroy Radio 
Le Caire (in August 1956) and Radio Damas (September 1956), which played a central role in the 
dissemination of anti-colonial messages to local populations throughout the region.35 
A ‘governmental order’ also cancelled a commando operations against an FLN training camp located 
in Libya in August 1956, while a ‘superior order’ cancelled the remote destruction of Tunisian 
barracks that were going to be occupied by the FLN in April 1957. Another ‘superior order’ cancelled 
an operation targeting a Yugoslav cargo in December 1957. Though the specific circumstances of 
these cancellations remain unclear, they highlight discrepancies between the plans developed by 
operators and the limits imposed by their superiors. One hypothesis is that some of these cancella-
tions reflect political limits on the conduct of paramilitary operations and concern with the ability to 
plausibly conceal, deny or – should deniability become impossible – explain French responsibility to 
foreign governments and the public.36 Destroying facilities in pro-Western Libya and military 
barracks in newly-independent Tunisia risked aggravating the conflict. Sinking a Yugoslav cargo 
and bombing objectives located in countries that displayed anti-Western tendencies (Syria) or 
received support from the Soviet Union (Egypt) would have posed a significant risk of escalation 
in the broader context of the Cold War.37 However sinking an Egyptian cargo and a tanker moored in 
Turkish and Belgian waters was deemed less problematic. These variations suggest decision-makers 
followed a certain logic that ruled out paramilitary actions they deemed too politically risky.
Outcomes, results and interpretations of ‘success’
Reporting on the results of these paramilitary actions raises conceptual questions about how to 
interpret their effectiveness. The table of operations presents basic information about the outcomes 
and results of each operation, which makes it possible to assess their success rate in a positivist 
manner. Out of the 30 operations that were conducted, twelve are presented as a ‘complete success’ 
(40%) and seven as a ‘partial success’ (23%). Overall, the rate of ‘complete success’ is higher for 
sabotage operations (42%) than for homicide operations (33%, three out of the nine HOMO opera-
tions that were not cancelled by superior order). Taking into account partial successes, homicide 
operations become more successful (66%) than sabotage operations (52%). There is no noticeable 
trend in the success rate of different types of sabotage operations. Those targeting vehicles such as 
cargoes and tankers (four complete successes and one partial success) were as ‘successful’ as those 
targeting premises (four complete successes and one partial success).
The determination of ‘success’ reveals the subjective nature of evaluating the results paramilitary 
actions.38 The document does not provide definitions for each type of result but information in the 
last two columns are sufficient to draw inferences. The yardstick used to measure success is strictly 
operational. Operations that are deemed to be a ‘complete success’ destroyed or eliminated their 
target. The way in which the author of the table determined ‘partial success’ is more debatable. In 
two homicide operations deemed to be ‘partial’ successes, the operators killed the mother of the 
target (Otto Schlüter) and hit the family of Dr. Tonnelot, who had provided support to FLN 
sympathizers. Two other partial successes involve homicide operations that injured but did not 
eliminate their target. Why were these actions presented as ‘partial successes’ if their target was not 
eliminated? One hypothesis is that these operations successfully disrupted some of the FLN support 
networks and publicly signalled that FLN supporters risked their lives (a form of dissuasion). In 
another case, a sabotage operation supposed to ‘attack all vehicles heading for Tunisia’ is presented 
as a ‘partial success’ but its outcome reads ‘complete success on the technical plan but no vehicle 
[was] encountered on the road’. The author displays a form of bias when presenting paramilitary 
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actions that did not achieve their stated objective as qualified successes. These ‘partial’ successes 
focus on the ability to operate more than the effects of each operation.
The assessment of results is equally problematic at the other end of the spectrum, where 
a number of operations failed or were cancelled due to some sort of failure. The table only identifies 
four cases of ‘failure’ (two targeting individuals, one targeting FLN premises and one targeting 
a cargo). However a number of operations marked as ‘cancelled’, especially those ‘cancelled follow-
ing security concern’ (three operations) and ‘due to the absence of an objective’ (six operations) can 
be considered respectively as operational and intelligence failures. The majority of these ‘cancella-
tions’ (seven of them) concerned ARMA operations on moving targets such as boats, cargos, tankers 
and vehicles. Two other cancellations targeted Ahmed Kamal who had left his hotel in Madrid before 
the operators arrived, and was too closely surrounded by other persons when an operator was 
supposed to shoot him a few months later.
These failures and cancellations reveal the fog of secret war, the uncertain and complex nature of 
paramilitary actions. In several instances, the author of the table adopts a narrow definition of failure 
that minimises the operators’ responsibility. Four failures reflect the role of friction, specifically the 
ways in which the means of action and their environment can hamper the conduct of paramilitary 
operations. In one case, an operator supposed to plant a timed explosive charge in FLN premises 
located in Tunis was arrested and interrogated, but he maintained his cover and was eventually 
released. In another case, an operator failed to eliminate arms dealer Marcel Léopold when his 
weapon misfired. A repeat operation assassinated Léopold one month later.39 Another operation 
aiming to eliminate Omar Ouamrane – an FLN leader in charge of weapons procurement and 
supplies40 – failed when the explosive charge detonated prematurely, killing the operators. In 
March 1958, a SDECE frogman successfully placed an explosive charge on an Egyptian cargo in 
Antwerp harbour. But the ‘charge was probably lost following a storm’ and never damaged the 
cargo. The extent to which paramilitary operations rely on accurate and timely intelligence is 
apparent in the six cases in which the absence of a target (mostly boats and in one case an FLN 
supporter) led to cancellation. Finally, three operations were cancelled following a ‘security concern’. 
In two of these three operations, the security breach could be imputed to the operators’ inability to 
maintain their cover. When preparing to place an underwater charge on an arms dealer’s ship, 
a team of operators was identified by the traffickers and the mission had to be cancelled. In another 
case, an operator who was supposed to place an explosive on an FLN vehicle was arrested by the 
police in Tunis. While some of these failures can be linked to bad luck, the majority of them can also 
be associated with insufficient or inadequate intelligence, and poor planning and tradecraft. Some of 
these failures were relatively minor, leading to loss of time and resources. Others were more 
significant because they revealed the hand of the operators – though not necessarily that of the 
French services – to their target.
Conclusion
The document analysed in this article provides a window into France’s use and the limits of 
paramilitary actions in the context of the Algerian war. The use of sabotage and assassination 
operations fits a broader pattern of colonial violence and reinforces the reputation of ruthlessness 
sometimes associated with French intelligence.41
Though the table of operations does not offer specific information on the rationales behind 
each operation, some inferences can be drawn from its analysis. The level of operational involve-
ment of the target seems to have influenced the approval of paramilitary actions. Presumably, 
there was a degree of opportunism too, the services proposed operations when targets could be 
identified and located in advance. Senior officials reviewed and cancelled those that were too 
politically sensitive and risked internationalising the conflict further, such as the assassination of 
President Nasser. But they approved dozen of operations targeting weapons traffickers, rebel 
chiefs and FLN supply networks in various sovereign, and sometimes friendly, countries. So long 
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as the services limited their ambitions and targets to arms dealers, FLN operatives and infrastruc-
ture – whose elimination had mostly tactical implications – decision-makers did not cancel their 
actions.
The analysis also highlighted how the fog and friction of secret war create room for different 
interpretations of ‘success’ and ‘failure’. This subjectivity is visible at the operational level displayed in 
the table, and more generally when the assessment moves from short-term tactical objectives to 
long-term strategic aims. While several paramilitary actions analysed in this article succeeded in 
disrupting FLN support infrastructure and networks they also contributed to France’s ruthless 
reputation. What looked like paramilitary successes to French decision-makers would systematically 
be interpreted as a form of colonial violence by its adversaries, thus raising questions about the 
strategic utility of paramilitary operations.
Operations conducted since the 1st of January 195642
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Algeria March 56 Booby-trapped radio set Destruction of Ben Moulaid 
Mostaffa
R 1
BEN BELLA Cairo Jul. 56 Attack with a suppressed firearm 
in the street
Operation cancelled at the last 
moment by governmental 
order
A 1
Arms dealer boat Trieste August 56 Underwater charge placed by 
a frogman. Insertion from land
Objective not encountered A 3
Arms dealer boat Tanger August 56 Underwater charge placed by 
a frogman. Insertion from boat
The boat was identified by the 





Libya August 56 Transport of a commando by 
submarine
Operation cancelled at the last 
moment by governmental 
order
A 1
Radio LE CAIRE Cairo August 56 Placement of an explosive by an 
operator
Operation cancelled by 
governmental order
A 1





Hamburg Sep. 56   The premises are significantly 
damaged. Schlutter is harmed, 
one of his friends is killed.
R 1
KAMAL Madrid Nov. 56 Attack the objective with 
a suppressed firearm in his 
hotel room
The target had left the hotel for 
an unknown destination
A 3
Arms dealer boat Trieste Dec. 56 Underwater charge set up by 
a frogman. Insertion from land
No objective encountered A 3
NASSER Port Said Dec. 56 Remotely controlled explosion at 
the arrival of the objective
Operation cancelled by superior 
order
A 1
F.L.N. vehicles Tunis Feb. 57 Placement of an explosive on the 
vehicle





Istanbul Feb. 57 Charge placed by a frogman Objective has left despite 
operators placing explosive 
within 24 h of receiving 
intelligence
A 3
F.L.N. premises Tunis March 57 Placement of a timed explosive 
charge
One of the operators was 
arrested and interrogated at 
length by the police, but 
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Target Location Date Means Outcome Result 
(see 
key)
F.L.N. premises Tunis March 57   Premise is destroyed – 3 FLN 
killed
R 1
Ahmed KAMAL Madrid March 57 Attacking the objective in his 
villa (suppressed firearm)
Presence of 3 persons close to 
the objective at the time of the 
attack prevented the operator 
from shooting
A 2
Danish cargo Tunis March 57 Underwater charge placed by 
a frogman.
The objective has not [moored] 
for a night in Tunis
A 3
ALLAL EL FASSI Tanger April 57 Triggering remotely controlled 
charge at the moment the 
objective is passing
Operation cancelled by superior 
order
A 1






they will be 
occupied by 
FLN
Tunisia April 57 Preparing barracks occupied by 
French troops for remote 
destruction months later at 
a large distance
Operation cancelled by superior 
order
A 1
Arms sale to FLN 
to arrest 
buyers
Lyon April 57 Establishing contact with 
intermediaries and delivering 
weapons
Arrest of interested parties. 
Recovery of the arms and 




Tanger May 57 Placement of an underwater 
charge by frogmen 
transported by boat
Destruction of Barra and Bruja 
Roja
R 1
Otto SCHLUTER Hamburg June 57 Placement of a charge under his 
car
The mother of the objective is 
killed
R 2
TONNELOT Oujda June 57 Placement of a charge on the 
terrace of the objective
His family is hit R 2
LEOPOLD Geneva August 57 Attacking the objective in the 
staircase of his apartment 
block
The weapon fails to fire at time of 
use
E
Attack all vehicles 
heading for 
Tunisia
Lybia August 57 Bling parachuting of a team 
preparing approach lights. 
Landing of a plane bringing 
a commando with 
autochthons – Take off after 
mission
Complete success on the 
technical plan but no vehicle 
encountered on the road
R 2
BOU ZIDIA Rabat August 57 Attack in the street at night, 
suppressed firearm
Objective severely injured R 2
Arms dealers 
boat
Tripoli Sept. 57 Placement of an underwater 
charge by frogmen 
transported by boat
Vittoria S. sunk in Sfax by the 
charge placed in Tripoli
R 1
LEOPOLD Geneva Sept. 57 Attack of the objective in the 
staircase of his apartment 
block
Objective killed R.1
OUAMRANE Tunis Sept. 57 Attack using a remotely 
controlled charge
The operators are killed by 
a premature detonation of the 
charge [manuscript note]
E
Finnish cargo Atlantic Oct. 57 Placement of a charge by 
frogman
Objective sank in high seas R 1
FLN explosives 
depot
Nador Dec. 57 Placement of a timed device by 
a commando transported by 
a fishing vessel
Objective entirely destroyed R 1
Yugoslav cargo Morocco Dec. 57 Placement of a charge by 
frogman
Operation cancelled by superior 
order
A 1
Yugoslav cargo Morocco Jan. 58 Placement of a charge by 
frogman
Cargo inspected by French Navy A 3
German cargo Algeria Jan. 58 Placement in the hold of an 
incendiary to create a minor 
incident that can serve as 
a warning
Incident signalled to the Llyod R 1
(Continued)
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Feb. 58 Low-altitude bombing by night 
by an unidentifiable plane, 
even by French military 
authorities
Objective partially hit R 2
Egyptian cargo Antwerp March 58 Placement of a charge by 
frogman
Placement is successful but the 
explosion did not take place 
because of an unknown cause, 




a print shop 
serving the 
FLN
Fedala In preparation Waiting for the order to execute P
Burning down 
a garage used 
by the FLN
Fez In preparation Waiting for the order to execute P
Destruction of 
a FLN grenade 
factory
Nador In preparation Waiting for the order to execute P
Destruction of 
a FLN radio 
training centre
Nador In preparation Waiting for the order to execute P
JAZOULI Abdel 
Kafi
Meknes In preparation Waiting for the order to execute P
ORMA OULD 
BABANA
Rabat In preparation Waiting for the order to execute P
RUHLMAN HAMBURG In preparation Waiting for the order to execute P
DRISS BEN SAID Rabat In preparation Waiting for the order to execute P
Arms dealers 
boat
Mediterranean In preparation Waiting for the order to execute P
SUMMARY of the MISSIONS
30 operations attempted:
- 17 cancelled
- 8 by superior order
- 3 following security concern
- 6 by absence of the objective
- 17 accomplished
- 12 complete success
- 5 partial success
- 4 failures
- 3 following technical incident
- 1 by arrest of the operator, but left no proof of the origin of the action
9 operations in preparation
KEY
R 1 = Complete success
R 2 = Partial success
A 1 = Cancelled by superior order
A 2 = Cancelled following security concern
A 3 = Cancelled due to absence of the objective
E = Failure
P = In preparation
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Notes
1. Archives Nationales (AN), Pierrefitte-Sur-Seine, AG/5(F)/318: Opérations réalisées depuis le 1er janvier 1956. 
A copy of the original document has been made available through the Wilson Centre Digital Archives, at 
<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/240232>.
2. In a more contemporary context, French practitioners do not use a literal translation of ‘covert action’ (action 
sous couverture), but talk about action clandestine. See Olivier Chopin and Benjamin Oudet, Renseignement et 
Sécurité (Paris: Armand Colin 2019), 137–40; Alain de Marolles, ‘La Tradition Française de l’Action Invisible’, in 
Pierre Lacoste (ed.), Le Renseignement à la française (Paris: Economica 1999), 337–8.
3. On the Algerian war of Independence see: Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War; Horne, A Savage War of Peace.
4. On violence, see: Branche, La torture et l’armée pendant la guerre d’Algérie; Thomas, Fight or Flight, 289–92. On the 
French doctrine of revolutionary war see Roger Trinquier (translated by Daniel Lee), Modern Warfare: A French 
View of Counterinsurgency (London: Pall Mall Press 1964); John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, ‘Revolutionary War’ in 
Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press 1986); Cradock and Smith, “No Fixed Values”.
5. Anderson, La guerre civile en France; Thomas, Le Béguec and Lachaise, Mai 1958.
6. Bat, ‘Les “archives Foccart” aux Archives nationales’, 189–201; Bat, Le Syndrome Foccart, 49–51. A guide is 
available online, see: Archives Nationales [thereafter AN], Archives du secrétariat général des Affaires africaines 
et malgaches et de la Communauté (1958-1974), at <https://www.siv.archives-nationales.culture.gouv.fr/siv/ 
rechercheconsultation/consultation/ir/consultationIR.action?irId=FRAN_IR_053799> (accessed 20 May 2021). 
For key research baed on these archives see: Bat, La fabrique des barbouzes; Bat, Forcade and Mary, Jacques 
Foccart: archives ouvertes; Bat, Les réseaux Foccart.
7. Turpin, Jacques Foccart.
8. A significant portion of ‘Foccart’s papers’ remains classified, and the role of intelligence in French decolonisation 
cannot and should not be reduced to Foccart’s papers and perspective.
9. Gaillard, Foccart Parle, tome I; Melnik, La mort était leur mission; von Bülow, West Germany; von Bülow, ‘Myth or 
reality?’.
10. Most of them are dated between late July and September 1958. AN, AG/5(F)/318: ‘Note à l’attention de 
M. Foccard. Les Services Secrets (Renseignements – Contre-espionnage – Action clandestine)’, 3 July 1958; 
‘Fiche relative à l’exécution d’une mission’, 28 July 1958.
11. AN, AG/5(F)/318: Opérations réalisées depuis le 1er janvier 1956.
12. The 6-page document bears no security marking and is freely accessible at the Archives Nationales and can 
therefore be reproduced without authorisation as long as there is no commercial purpose.
13. For more on this strategy see von Bülow, West Germany, 53; Shy and Collier, ‘Revolutionary War’; Cradock and 
Smith, ‘“No Fixed Values.
14. The list of operations mentioned in the table might not be exhaustive. See for example discussion of the 
sabotage of the cargoes Emma and Typhoon, and the assassination of Georges Geiser in Faligot, Guisnel and 
Kauffer, Histoire politique des services secrets français, 220; Krop, Les secret de l’espionnage français, 479–88.
15. The ‘Lamine Guèye’ law recognized the French citizenship of individuals from French Overseas Territories. 
National Assembly, loi tendant à proclamer citoyens tous les ressortissants des territoires d’outre-mer, law no 46- 
940, 7 May 1946.
16. Those of Edgar Faure (1955-56), Guy Mollet (1956-57), Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury (1957), and Félix Gaillard 
(1957-58). For some context on the failure of the Fourth Republic see Knapp and Wright, The government and 
politics of France, 50-1.
17. On this intensification, see: Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, 148-225; Cradock and Smith, “No Fixed 
Values”, 80–83; Tenenbaum, Partisans et Centurions, 240–43.
18. Evans, Algeria, 116.
19. Cradock and Smith, “No Fixed Values”, 96.
20. Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 8; von Bülow, West Germany, 30–5.
21. One target remains unclear and could not be categorised.
22. ‘La rencontre Dubois-Valino’, Le Monde, 12 January 1956; Marchat, ‘La France et l’Espagne au Maroc pendant la 
période du Protectorat (1912-1956)’, 104–5.
23. On Kamal and Schlüter see von Bülow, West Germany, 135, 139. A SDECE document in the Fonds Foccart 
identifies Hans Peter Rullmann and Driss Ben Said as ‘traffickers’. See: AN, AG/5(F)/318: ‘Fiche concernant les 
objectifs “HOMO”’, 5 August 1958, 1.
24. Agence France Presse, ‘Un pharmacien algérien (qui ne payait plus le F.L.N.) tué par une bombe’, Le Monde, 
22 April 1957.
25. Djamel Belbey, ‘L’apport de la famille de la santé à la révolution. Les blouses blanches au cœur du combat’, 
Mémoria, 6 October 2012, 72. The author does not cite his sources.
26. AN, AG/5(F)/318: ‘Fiche: rôle du S.D.E.C.E. en ALGERIE’, 1.
27. Essemlali, ‘Le Maroc entre la France et l’Algérie (1956-1962)’, 88 (note 53).
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28. On the long history and multiple forms of French colonial violence in Algeria see: Ageron, Genèse de l’Algérie 
algérienne, 577–88; Brower, A Desert Named Peace, 5–10; Gallois, A History of Violence in the Early Algerian Colony.
29. Raymond Muelle describes both a bottom-up and a top-down a similar logic of actions executed at the request 
of the authorities, in a chapter covering the period 1958-1960. See: Muelle, ‘Le 11e choc pendant la guerre 
d’Algérie’, 154–55. Journalists Roger Faligot, Jean Guisnel and Rémi Kauffer claim that Guy Mollet, who served as 
Prime Minister from February 1956 to June 1957, authorized sabotage and homicide operations from 
September 1956 onwards, but they do not cite their source. See Faligot, Guisnel, and Kauffer, Histoire politique 
des services secrets français, 220.
30. ‘Allal el-Fassoi, 82, Dead; Top Moroccan Nationalist’, New York Times, 14 May 1974, 40.
31. Presumably not because of a SDECE operation. See Assemblée Nationale, ‘Babana Horma’, at <http://www2. 
assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/fiche/%28num_dept%29/3860>.
32. Evans, Algeria, 119, 126; Morizot, “Ben Boulaïd, Mosteffa”.
33. von Bülow, West Germany, 36–39.
34. Evans, Algeria, 186–87.
35. Ageron, Genèse de l’Algérie algérienne, 577–88; Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 28.
36. These concerns would reflect a ‘state model’ of plausible deniability discussed in Poznansky, “Revisiting plausible 
deniability”, 3–5.
37. For a similar point see Porch, The French Secret Services, 370.
38. This argument is further developed in: Cormac, Walton and Van Puyvelde, ‘What constitutes successful covert 
action?’.
39. The documentary evidence corroborates suggestions made in von Bülow, West Germany, 308; Faligot, Guisnel, 
and Kauffer, Histoire politique des services secrets français, 220.
40. Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 183.
41. Porch, The French Secret Services, 370.
42. AN, AG/5(F)/318: Opérations réalisées depuis le 1er janvier 1956. Translation by the author. The translation 
follows a literal approach, using the same spelling, wording and grammar than in the original document 
whenever possible.
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